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Radical Questioning on the Long Walk to Freedom: 
Nelson Mandela and the Practice of Critical Reflection 
 
Stephen Brookfield 
University of St. Thomas, USA 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the autobiography of Nelson Mandela Long 
Walk to Freedom. Using a formulation of critical reflection as the 
deliberate uncovering and challenging of assumptions concerning power 
and hegemony, Long Walk to Freedom is subjected to a thematic content 
analysis using the analytical heuristic of critical reflection. 
 
Long Walk to Freedom can be analyzed as a chronicle of critical reflection in 
practice, if we understand this process in a politicized way as the uncovering and 
exploration of assumptions concerning power dynamics and the maintenance of ruling 
class hegemony. The book describes how an iconic political activist and freedom fighter 
reflected on, and sometimes modified, several core assumptions at the heart of his 
struggle to overturn the White supremacist, minority hegemony and create a free South 
Africa. These assumptions were either completely upended or significantly altered as a 
result of being reviewed through various critically reflective lenses that are similar to the 
lenses central to the reflective process. Mandela used four lenses on his practice as a 
freedom fighter and then President in waiting; he constantly reviewed his 
autobiographical experiences as a freedom fighter, he relied on the lens of his colleagues’ 
(particularly his fellow ANC executive committee members) perceptions, he sought out 
the lens of literature (particularly radical literature on political economy and the raising 
and training of a guerilla army), and he was committed to regularly consulting the lens of 
ANC (African National Congress) members’ eyes. Although clearly unaware of adult 
education’s utilization of this term, Mandela’s reasoning on tactics and strategy, his 
awareness of the need to reappraise assumptions that previously were viewed as gospel, 
and his use of multiple lenses through which to view his actions as a freedom fighter, 
exemplify the practice of critical reflection. Mandela’s engagement in critical reflection 
on the four core assumptions analyzed in this article was resonant with implications for 
millions of South Africans, and for others across the globe engaged in a struggle for 
liberation against the remnants of colonialism. It is hard to imagine an example of 
critically reflective adult learning that has greater significance.  
 
Assumption (1): The Struggle for Black Liberation Must be Conducted 
by Black South Africans Alone 
The first assumption explored by Mandela is his belief that the movement for a 
free South Africa must be one in which only Black South Africans should be involved; 
specifically, his belief that the African National Congress (ANC) should not admit 
Whites as members, nor cooperate with White groups (such as the South African 
Communist Party) that were also dedicated to the dismantling of apartheid. This 
assumption was based on Mandela’s belief that the stain of racism had spread so deep 
into African consciousness that Whites would inevitably come to be seen as leaders 
within the ANC and occupy leadership positions. Mandela argued to his ANC comrades 
that if Whites were initially involved as equals in the movement, this early equality 
would quickly be superceded by Whites moving into leadership positions. One reason for 
this trend, he argued, was the unconscious perception of White superiority held by Blacks 
who would be subliminally predisposed to defer to White ideas. Hence, “if blacks were 
offered a multiracial form of struggle, they would remain enamored of white culture and 
prey to a continuing sense of inferiority” (Mandela, 1994, p. 100).  
Mandela was also suspicious of Whites’ intent, particularly White Communists, 
who he believed “were intent on taking over our movement in the guise of joint action” 
(p. 108). He also had an Africentric skepticism of the relevance of a Marxist analysis to 
the African liberation struggle. His belief at this time in his life was that “it was an 
undiluted African nationalism, not Marxism or multiracialism, that would liberate us” (p. 
108). In 1947 the Youth League of the ANC produced a major policy document that 
called for “a powerful national liberation movement under the banner of African 
nationalism and led by Africans themselves” (p.112). Mandela notes that the contents of 
the document were contested, reflecting “the push-and-pull between two rival theories of 
African nationalism, between the more extreme, Marcus Garvey-inspired, ‘Africa for the 
Africans’ nationalism and the Africanism of the Youth League, which recognized that 
South Africa was a multiracial country” (p. 112). His own position was that “I was 
sympathetic to the ultra-revolutionary stream of African nationalism” (p.112). 
In the decade after the forming of the Youth League, however, Mandela 
experienced a number of events that caused him to revise his earlier assumption that the 
liberation struggle should be the preserve only of Black South Africans. The first of these 
was his numerous conversations with South African Communist Party members such as 
Moses Kotane, Ismail Meer and Ruth First. Here the lens of colleagues’ perceptions is 
clearly described. Mandela reflects on how, in the 1940’s “I was far more certain in those 
days of what I was against than what I was for” (p. 119). He describes how Kotane would 
come to his house late at night and the two of them would debate until morning. As a 
result of these conversations, Mandela found that “my long-standing opposition to 
communism was breaking down” (p. 119) and that “I was finding it more and more 
difficult to justify my prejudice against the party” (p. 119). He noted how party members 
who were also ANC members (such as J.B. Marks, Edwin Mofutsanyana, Dan Thoome 
and David Bopape) “were devoted and hardworking, and left nothing to gainsay as 
freedom fighters” (1994, 120). This means that Mandela “could not, and no longer did, 
question the bona fides of such men and women” (p. 120). 
Having had his skepticism of communists weakened through conversation and 
observation, Mandela was prompted to initiate a self-directed study of dialectical 
materialism. Here, the role of literature as an aid to challenging assumptions is front and 
center. He describes reading Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao and being stimulated 
by the Communist Manifesto and exhausted by Das Kapital. He records how he found 
himself drawn to the idea of a classless society, which, to his mind, “was similar to 
traditional African culture where life was shared and communal. I subscribed to Marx’s 
basic dictum, which has the simplicity and generosity of the Golden Rule: “From each 
according to his ability; to each according to his needs” (p.120). In the manner of Angela 
Davis (1974) who wrote how The Communist Manifesto hit her “like a bolt of lightning” 
(p. 109) Mandela found that “Dialectical materialism seemed to offer both a searchlight 
illuminating the dark night of racial oppression and a tool that could be used to end it. It 
helped me to see the situation other than through the prism of white and black relations, 
for if our struggle was to succeed, we had to transcend black and white” (Mandela, 1994, 
p. 120). He documents how the quasi-scientific underpinnings of dialectical materialism 
attracted him since, in his words “I am always inclined to trust what I can verify. Its 
materialistic analysis of economic rang true to me” (p. 120). He also found in his reading 
of these texts a number of practical suggestions that seemed to him helpful to the 
struggles he was conducting. Finally, the Soviet Union’s support for anti-colonial 
struggles in Asia and Africa, explained “why I amended my views of communists and 
accepted the ANC view of welcoming Marxists into its ranks” (p. 121). 
As well as holding numerous conversations with Communists, and his own 
studies in dialectical materialism, Mandela was also prompted to re-examine his 
assumptions about working with Communists after reflecting on his own 
autobiographical experiences. The success of the mass action of March 1950, where over 
two thirds of African workers stayed at home, was clear to Mandela, and he was forced to 
acknowledge that Communists had played a significant part in planning and conducting 
this mass action. The fact that the government too recognized the pivotal role of the 
Communist Party in fomenting successful mass action was indicated by the fact that a 
few weeks later it passed the Suppression of Communism Act, a development that caused 
Mandela to declare that “clearly, the repression of any one liberation group was 
repression against all liberation groups” (p. 117). He noted the prophetic words of Oliver 
Tambo (for many years head of ANC in exile) “Today it is the Communist Party. 
Tomorrow it will be our trade unions, our Indian Congress, our APO, our African 
National Congress” (p. 117).  
By the 1950s, then, Mandela had overturned his earlier assumption that the ANC 
struggle was best conducted by Black South Africans alone, and that Whites, particularly 
White Communists, would inevitably take the movement over. He had found there to be 
no contradiction between African nationalism and dialectical materialism. In his view 
“Our problems, while distinctive and special, were not entirely unique, and a philosophy 
that placed those problems in an international and historical context of the greater world 
and the course of history was valuable …. I found that African nationalists and African 
Communists generally had far more uniting them than dividing them” (p. 121).  
By the time of his statement at his trial in Rivonia in 1963 and 1964, he had come 
to a fully elaborated rationale for his decision to work with the Communist Party. In his 
own words “It is true that there has often been close cooperation between the ANC and 
Communist Party. But cooperation is merely proof of a common goal – in this case the 
removal of white supremacy – and is not proof of a complete community of interests” (p. 
366). In explaining why the ANC viewed Communist Party members as friends, Mandela 
stated “to us the reason is obvious. Theoretical differences amongst those fighting against 
oppression is a luxury we cannot afford at this stage. What is more, for many decades 
Communists were the only political group in South Africa who were prepared to treat 
Africans as human beings and their equals; who were prepared to eat with us; talk with 
us, live and work with us. Because of this, there are many Africans who, today, tend to 
equate freedom with communism” (p. 366). Twenty years later, when engaged in secret 
negotiations with the government who were insisting he cut ties with the Communist 
Party, he repeated the same argument: “I said, no self-respecting freedom fighter would 
take orders from a government he is fighting against or jettison a longtime ally in the 
interest of pleasing an antagonist” (Mandela, 1994, p. 538). 
 
Assumption # 2 Non-Violent Struggle Was Most Likely to 
Bring About the End of Apartheid  
A second assumption concerns Mandela’s initial belief that a nonviolent strategy 
for political change that focused on mass civil disobedience was the most effective 
weapon in the struggle against apartheid. Mandela’s approach to the struggle was always 
dictated by a pragmatic concern to experiment with whatever means might speed the end 
of apartheid. To that end his first years as an activist were spent pursuing various paths of 
non-violent resistance. These included strikes, boycotts, contraventions of the pass laws 
(that determined where Black South Africans could travel) and stay at homes. Mandela 
analyzed the situation facing Black South Africans and determined that tactical 
considerations, rather than a moral commitment to non-violence, dictated this strategy. 
Writing about the various discussions he had held on how best to put pressure on the 
South African regime he summarizes his position thus: “We should approach this issue 
not from the point of view of principles but of tactics, and (that) we should employ the 
method demanded by the conditions. If a particular method or tactic enabled us to defeat 
the enemy, then it should be used” (p. 127).  
From Mandela’s position “stay-at-homes allowed us to strike at the enemy while 
preventing him from striking back. I argued that the confidence of the people in our 
campaigns had grown precisely because they realized that we were not reckless with their 
lives” (Mandela, p. 266). This desire to avoid bloodshed governed much of Mandela’s 
early thinking and was the chief reason why he put so much emphasis on non-violence. In 
his view “the state was far more powerful than we, and any attempts at violence by us 
would be devastatingly crushed. This made nonviolence a practical necessity rather than 
an option” (p. 127). To Mandela, then, nonviolence was a tactic to be used as long as the 
situation demanded it. Once it ceased to be effective, by implication, it would be replaced 
with an approach that made more sense in any new circumstances. There was none of the 
moral commitment to nonviolence that one associates with Gandhi or Martin Luther 
King. To Mandela if something worked it would be used, if not it would be abandoned.  
In the face of ever more repressive action by the South African apartheid regime, 
Mandela was forced to rethink his whole strategy for the establishment of democracy in 
South Africa, a period of questioning that ultimately led to him spending most of his 
adult life in prison and wrecking any chance of his enjoying a normal family life. 
Claiming that the government’s actions had forced his hand, Mandela moved reluctantly 
to urge the ANC to take up arms, in particular to conduct a campaign of sabotage against 
power stations, arms depots and communications networks. On the wider political stage 
the move to begin a campaign of sabotage against government and military targets 
ushered in an era of even greater repression and the deaths of many on both sides of the 
struggle. This new assumption that the armed struggle was now the most effective tactic 
for achieving long-term change was itself subject to critical reflection many years later. 
In questioning his earlier assumption Mandela argued that the conditions faced 
both by Gandhi and King were strikingly different from those faced by freedom fighters 
in South Africa. India was ruled by an overstretched colonial power that had accepted the 
ultimate inevitability of self-rule. The USA was a democracy with constitutional 
guarantees of equal rights, even if these were abused in practice. No such guarantees 
were available in the police state of South Africa. In his view, “Non-violent passive 
resistance is effective as long as your opposition adheres to the same rules as you do. But 
if peaceful protest is met with violence, its efficacy is at an end. For me, nonviolence was 
not a moral principle but a strategy; there is no moral goodness in using an ineffective 
weapon” (p. 158). From this point on a repeated theme in Mandela’s work was the way in 
which his tactics – particularly the move to armed resistance – was forced on him by the 
government’s actions. For example, when meeting two editors from the Washington Post 
in 1984, Mandela professed his Christianity but argued that “Even Christ…when he was 
left with no alternative, used force to expel the moneylenders from the temple. He was 
not a man of violence, but had no choice but to use force against evil” (p. 521).  
All his adult life - from his work as a lawyer, through to his going underground, 
during his imprisonment, and in his conversations with the apartheid government – 
Mandela argued that freedom fighting tactics were always dictated by, and responsive to, 
government actions. This lesson springs entirely from his examination of the struggle 
through the critically reflective lens of autobiographical experience. His experience as a 
freedom fighter taught him “the hard way that it is the oppressor who defines the nature 
of the struggle, and the oppressed is often left no recourse but to use methods that mirror 
those of the oppressor. At a certain point, one can only fight fire with fire” (Mandela, p. 
164). In 1985, when the government secretly tried to pressure him to declare the end of 
the armed struggle “I responded that the state was responsible for the violence and that it 
is always the oppressor, not the oppressed, who dictates the form of the struggle. If the 
oppressor uses violence, the oppressed have no alternative but to respond violently. In 
our case it was simply a legitimate form of self-defense” (p. 537).  
The experience of being despised as an outlaw also taught him how the dynamics 
of the struggle are defined by external forces. His own outlaw status was not one he 
sought, but one forced upon him since “When a man is denied the right to live the life he 
believes in, he has no other choice but to become an outlaw” (1994, p. 256). The decision 
by the ANC in 1961 to move to armed struggle as a matter of policy was one of the most 
significant of his life. Ironically, given the accusations that the ANC was a Communist 
pawn or front organization, this decision was opposed by the South African Communist 
party. In argument with Moses Kotane (secretary of the South African Communist Party) 
Mandela admonished Kotane for waiting for the text-book revolutionary conditions 
advocated by Lenin and Stalin to occur. To Mandela “Castro did not wait, he acted – and 
he triumphed. If you wait for textbook conditions, they will never occur” (p. 271). 
The way in which Mandela examined and changed his assumption regarding the 
effectiveness of nonviolence illustrated his capacity to alter his exercise of leadership in 
response to changing circumstances. On the one hand, he frequently articulates the need 
for a form of collective responsibility and developmental leadership from the grass roots. 
Hence, one reason for the move to armed struggle was the fact that this was happening 
anyway as Black South Africans were forming their own military units. Consequently, 
the ANC needed to be the organization directing their actions. In his view “We have 
always maintained that the people were ahead of us, and now they were” (1994, p. 272). 
Contrarily, however, he also argued that leadership sometimes involved individual 
leaders moving against an already agreed upon and articulated collective policy. An 
example of this was the deliberate break he made with ANC policy when he gave a 
statement to the local and national South African press in May 1961 stating that the ANC 
was now closing the chapter on nonviolent policy and moving into a different phase of 
the struggle – armed resistance. As Mandela acknowledged “It was a grave declaration 
and I knew it. I was criticized by our executive for making that remark before it was 
discussed by the organization, but sometimes one must go public with an idea to push a 
reluctant organization in the direction you want it to go” (1994, p. 270).  
In choosing sabotage against power stations, arms depots and communications 
systems the ANC was strategizing for what would happen after apartheid was removed. 
The choice of sabotage was deliberated and considered, based on the assumption that a 
strategy involving the smallest loss of life would have the widest favorable reception. 
Mandela wrote “Because it did not involve loss of life it offered the best hope for 
reconciliation among the races afterward. We did not want to start a blood feud between 
white and black. Animosity between Afrikaner and Englishman was still sharp fifty years 
after the Anglo-Boer war; what would race relations be like between white and black if 
we provoked a civil war? Sabotage had the added virtue of requiring the least manpower” 
(1994, pp. 282-283). In testimony during his 1964 trial he denied that the ANC had been 
preparing for guerilla war, but did not deny his planning of sabotage. As always, he 
maintained external forces had impelled these strategic choices in the fight for freedom. 
The decision was one forced on him by the government; “I did not plan it in a spirit of 
recklessness nor because I have any love of violence. I planned it as a result of a calm 
and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny, 
exploitation, and oppression of my people by whites” (Mandela, 1994, p. 364). The 
intention “was to begin with what was least violent to individuals but most damaging to 
the state” (p. 274) and key to this campaign was the issuing of “Strict instructions ... that 
we would countenance no loss of life” (p. 283).  
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